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Abstract
A strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle that is immune to joint devia-
tions. Diﬀerent notions of strong correlated equilibria were deﬁned in the literature.
One major diﬀerence among those deﬁnitions is the stage in which coalitions can
plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the deviating players re-
ceive their part of the correlated proﬁle. In this paper we prove that if deviating
coalitions are allowed to use new correlating devices, then an ex-ante strong corre-
lated equilibrium is also immune to deviations at the ex-post stage. Thus the set of
ex-ante strong correlated equilibria of Moreno & Wooders (1996) is included in all
other sets of strong correlated equilibria.
1 Introduction
The ability of players to communicate prior to the play, inﬂuences the set
of self-enforcing outcomes of a non-cooperative game. The communication al-
lows the players to correlate their play, and to implement a correlated strategy
proﬁle as a feasible non-biding agreement. For such an agreement to be self-
enforcing, it has to be stable against reasonable coalitional deviations. Two
notions in the literature describe such self-enforcing agreements: a strong cor-
related equilibrium is a proﬁle that is stable against all coalitional deviations,
and a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is a proﬁle that is stable against
self-enforcing coalitional deviations (a deviation is self-enforcing if there is
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no further self-enforcing and improving deviation available to a proper sub-
coalition).
Each notion has a few alternative deﬁnitions. One major diﬀerence among
them, is the stage in which coalitions can plan a deviation from a correlated
agreement. Assume that the correlated agreement is implemented by a me-
diator who privately recommends each player what to play. The deﬁnitions
in Milgrom & Roberts (1996), Moreno & Wooders (1996), and Ray (1996)
are ex-ante deﬁnitions: In their framework, players may plan deviations be-
fore receiving recommendations, and no further communication is possible af-
ter recommendations are issued. The deﬁnitions in Einy & Peleg (1995), Ray
(1998) and Bloch & Dutta (2007) are ex-post 2 deﬁnitions: In their framework,
players may plan deviations only after receiving recommendations.
However, in some frameworks it is reasonable to assume that coalitions can
plan deviations at both stages: ex-ante and ex-post. One example for such
framework is an extended game with cheap-talk : pre-play, unmediated, non-
biding, non-veriﬁable communication among the players. 3 In such a frame-
work, the players can mimic a mediator, and implement a large set of strong
correlated equilibria as a strong Nash equilibria (Aumann, 1959) in the ex-
tended game (Heller, 2008). 4 A coalition can plan a deviation in the early
phases of the cheap-talk when no player has received his recommendation yet
(an ex-ante deviation), or in the late phases when all players have received
their recommendations (an ex-post deviation).
A natural question is whether any of the existing notions is appropriate to such
frameworks (in which deviations can be planned at both stages), or whether
new deﬁnitions are needed. In this paper we prove that the existing ex-ante
strong correlated equilibrium (a` la Moreno & Wooders) is also resistant to
ex-post deviations. The proof is based on three assumptions about the com-
munication framework (which hold in the cheap-talk framework):
(1) A deviating coalition can use new correlating devices (play a joint corre-
lated deviation).
(2) When a coalition decides to deviate, that decision is common knowledge
among its members.
(3) The players share a common prior about the possible states of the world
2 Referred to as interim deﬁnitions in some of the literature.
3 For a good nontechnical introduction to some of the main issues of cheap-talk, see
the survey of Farrel & Rabin (1996).
4 The implementation presented in Heller (2008) is only as a bn/2c-strong correlated
equilibrium (an equilibrium that is resistant to deviations of coalitions with less
than n/2 players). If one assumes that the players are computationally restricted and
one-way functions exist, then the implementation can be as a strong correlated
equilibrium (as discussed in Lepinski et al., 2004 and Abraham et al., 2006).
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in an incomplete information model a` la Aumann (see Aumann, 1987,
and the description in Subsection 3.3).
An immediate corollary is that the set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria
is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria, as deﬁned in any
of the existing deﬁnitions in the literature referred above, or in the new more
general ex-post deﬁnition presented in this paper.
One could hope that similar results might be obtained for the coalition-
proof notions. However, in Section 5 we demonstrate that the existing ex-ante
coalition-proof notion is not appropriate to frameworks in which coalitions can
plan deviations at both stages.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we show a few examples for
ex-ante and ex-post strong correlated equilibria. Section 3 presents our model
and deﬁnitions, Section 4 presents our main result. In Section 5 we discuss the
coalition-proof notions, and we conclude in Section 6.
2 Examples for Strong Correlated Equilibria
In this Section we present two examples for strong correlated equilibria (both
examples are adapted from Moreno & Wooders, 1996):
(1) An example for an ex-ante (and ex-post) strong correlated equilibrium,
which is the only reasonable outcome of a game with pre-play commu-
nication.
(2) An example for an ex-post strong correlated equilibrium that is not an
ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium.
2.1 Example 1 - Three Player Matching Pennies Game
Three players each simultaneously choose heads or tails. If all three faces
match, then players 1 and 2 each win a penny while player 3 loses two pennies.
Otherwise, Player 3 wins two pennies while players 1 and 2 each lose a penny.
Table 1 presents the matrix representation of the game.
This game has three Nash equilibria:
• Two pure equilibria: (H1, H2, T3), (T1, T2, H3) that give a payoﬀ of (−1,−1, 2)
• A totally mixed equilibrium in which every action is chosen with probability
1/2, which gives an expected payoﬀ of (−0.5,−0.5, 1).
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Table 1
The Three Player Matching Pennies Game
H3 T3
H2 T2 H2 T2
H1 1,1,-2 -1,-1,2 H1 -1,-1,2 -1,-1,2
T1 -1,-1,2 -1,-1,2 T1 -1,-1,2 1,1,-2
None of those equilibria is a reasonable outcome of a game with pre-play com-
munication, as players 1 and 2 can play together a correlated strategy proﬁle
that guarantees each of them a payoﬀ of 0: playing (H1, H2) with probability
0.5 and (T1, T2) with probability 0.5.
This game has a single ex-ante (and ex-post) strong correlated equilibrium:
players 1 and 2 play the correlated proﬁle mentioned above, and player 3
plays heads with probability 0.5 and tails with probability 0.5. The induced
correlated proﬁle, which is described in table 2, gives an expected payoﬀ of
(0, 0, 0).
Table 2
The Ex-ante Strong Equilibrium of the Game
H3 T3
H2 T2 H2 T2
H1 1/4 0 H1 1/4 0
T1 0 1/4 T1 0 1/4
The proﬁle is a strong correlated equilibrium because no single player can de-
viate and improve upon this agreement: both players 1 and 2 loose by unilat-
erally deviating, and player 3 is indiﬀerent between heads and tails. Moreover,
since the interests of players 1 and 2 are completely opposed to those of player
3, no coalition involving player 3 can improve upon the given agreement. Fi-
nally, given player 3's strategy, players 1 and 2 obtain at most a payoﬀ of 0.
Hence, no coalition can gain by deviating from the agreement. In Moreno &
Wooders (1998), an experimental study is presented to show that players tend
to play this strong correlated equilibrium (and not any of the Nash equilibria)
in the presence of pre-play (private) communication.
2.2 Example 2 - Two-Player Chicken Game
Table 3 describes a two player Chicken game and a strong ex-post correlated
equilibrium (with an expected payoﬀ of 5 for each player), which is not an
ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium. The proﬁle is not an ex-ante strong
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correlated equilibrium, because the players have a proﬁtable joint ex-ante de-
viation: play the pure action proﬁle (T, L), which gives both player a higher
payoﬀ of 6.
Table 3
Chicken Game and an Ex-post Strong Correlated Equilibrium
L R
T 6,6 2,7
B 7,2 0,0
L R
T 1/3 1/3
B 1/3 0
We now show that the proﬁle is an ex-post strong correlated equilibrium.
Observe ﬁrst that the proﬁle is a correlated equilibrium, thus no player has a
proﬁtable unilateral deviation. We have to show that there are no proﬁtable
ex-ante joint deviations. Assume to the contrary that there is a proﬁtable ex-
post joint deviation. When the players deviate, it must be common knowledge
that both earn from the deviation. Observe that if player 1 (2) has received
a recommendation B (R), then he expects to get his maximal payoﬀ 7, and
he can not earn from the use of any deviating device. Thus, when the players
deviate, it must be common knowledge that the recommendation proﬁle is
(T, L), but then it is common knowledge that the payoﬀ of each player is 6,
and there is no deviation that can improve the payoﬀs of both players.
3 Model and Deﬁnitions
3.1 Preliminary Deﬁnitions
A game in strategic form G is deﬁned as: G =
(
N, (Ai)i∈N , (u
i)i∈N
)
, where N
is the ﬁnite (and non-empty) set of players with a size n = |N |, and for each
i ∈ N , Ai is player i 's ﬁnite (and non-empty) set of actions (or pure strategies),
and ui is player i 's utility (payoﬀ) function, a real-valued function on A =∏
i∈N
Ai. The multi-linear extension of ui to ∆ (A) is is still denoted by ui. A
member of ∆ (A) is called a (correlated) strategy proﬁle. A coalition S is a non-
empty member of 2N . For simplicity of notation, the coalition {i} is denoted
as i. Given a coalition S, and let AS =
∏
i∈S
Ai, let −S = {i ∈ N | i /∈ S} denote
the complementary coalition. A member of ∆(AS) is called a (correlated)
S -strategy proﬁle. Given q ∈ ∆(A) and aS ∈ AS, we deﬁne q|S ⊆ ∆(AS)
to be q|S(aS) =
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(aS, a−S), and for simplicity we omit the subscript:
q(aS) = q|S(aS). Given aS s.t. q(aS) > 0, we deﬁne q(a−S|aS) = q(aS ,a−S)q(aS) .
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3.2 An Ex-ante Strong Correlated Equilibrium
In this subsection, following the framework presented in Moreno & Wooders
(1996), we conceive a framework in which deviations from an agreement are
only planned at the ex-ante stage. Let the correlated strategy proﬁle q ∈ ∆(A)
be an agreement that have been reached by the players. The players imple-
ment the agreement q with the assistance of a correlating device (a mediator)
who recommends the action proﬁle a ∈ A with probability q(a). Each player
i receives his recommendation ai in a sealed envelope. At that stage (when
all the envelopes are sealed) the players can communicate and possibly plan
coalitional deviations from the agreement. If all the members of a coalition S
agree to use a deviation, then it is implemented with the assistance of a devi-
ating device (a new correlating device - another mediator), who receives the
sealed envelopes from each player in S, privately reads their contents, and gives
each player a new recommendation in a sealed envelope. Thus the deviating
device implement a mapping from the set AS (the original recommendations
the players in S have received) to the set of ∆(AS) of correlated S -strategy
proﬁles. In the second stage, the players open their sealed envelopes, and each
player simultaneously chooses an action (no further communication occurs).
Deﬁnition 1 Given a coalition S ⊆ N , a deviating device is a function
dS : AS → ∆(AS).
We deﬁne the feasible deviations for a coalition S, as those correlated strategy
proﬁles p ∈ A that the coalition can induce with the use of deviating devices.
Thus, a correlated strategy proﬁle is a feasible ex-ante deviation by a coalition
S from a given agreement if the members of S, using some plan to correlate
their play (a deviating device), can induce the strategy proﬁle when each
member of the complementary coalition obeys his recommendation.
Deﬁnition 2 Let q ∈ ∆(A) be a strategy proﬁle and let S ⊆ N be a coalition.
We say that p ∈ ∆(A) is a feasible ex-ante deviation by a coalition S from
q if there is a deviating device dS : AS → ∆(AS) such that for all a ∈ A we
have p(a) =
∑
bS∈AS
q(bS, a−S) · dS(aS|bS). In that case we say that p is induced
from q by the deviating device dS. Let D(q, S) ⊆ ∆(A) denote the set of all
feasible ax-ante deviations by a coalition S from q.
An ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle from which no
coalition has a proﬁtable ex-ante deviation: a feasible deviation that makes
every member of the coalition better oﬀ.
Deﬁnition 3 (deﬁnition 1.2 of Moreno & Wooders) A strategy proﬁle q ∈
∆(A) is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium if no coalition S ⊆ N has a
feasible deviation p ∈ D(q, S), such that for each i ⊆ S, we have ui(p) > ui(q).
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Remark 4 Similar to the existing notions of a strong correlated equilibria, we
assume that the deviating players are myopic: they do not take into account
the possibility that there may be further deviations.
Diﬀerent notions of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria have been presented in
Ray (1996) and Milgrom & Roberts (1996). In the framework of Ray, deviating
coalitions are not allowed to construct new correlating devices, and are limited
to use only an uncorrelated deviating device - a function dS : AS → ∏
i∈S
∆(Ai). 5
In the framework of Milgrom & Roberts only some of the coalitions can com-
municate and coordinate deviations. In both cases the sets of feasible coali-
tional deviations is included in our set of feasible coalitional deviations, and
thus our set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria is included in the sets of
ex-ante correlated equilibria a` la Ray and a` la Milgrom & Roberts.
3.3 An Ex-post Strong Correlated Equilibrium
In this subsection, we conceive a diﬀerent framework in which deviations from
an agreement are only planned at the ex-post stage. As in the previous frame-
work, the players implement an agreement q ∈ ∆(A) with the assistance of a
correlating device who recommends the action proﬁle a ∈ A with probability
q(a). However, in this framework no communication is done before the players
receive their recommendations. Only after each player i is informed of his rec-
ommendation ai, then the players communicate and may plan joint deviations.
As before, if the members of a coalition S unanimously agree to use a devi-
ation, then it is implemented with the assistance of a deviating device, who
receives the recommendations from each player in S, and gives each player a
new recommendation. After all agreed deviations (if any) were implemented,
each player simultaneously chooses an action.
We assume that a decision of the members of S to implement a deviating
device, is common knowledge among the members of S. This is the case, for
example, in the following setup:
• All the members of S meet face-to-face (after each of them received his
original recommendation).
• Any player can suggest to implement a deviating device.
• Each of the players says if he agrees to use it.
• At any stage of the conversation, a player can change his mind.
5 In Ray's setup, the original correlating device can also send an indirect signal to
each player (which may hold more information than the recommendation itself). In
that case, the uncorrelated deviating device is a function from the set of S -part of
the signals to the set of uncorrelated S -strategy proﬁles.
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• If and only if at the end of the conversation, all the players (in S ) agree to
use the deviating device (and no one changes his mind), then the deviating
device is implemented.
When the members of S consider to implement a deviating device, they are in
a situation of incomplete information: each player has the private value of his
recommendation, and may have additional private information acquired when
communicating with the other deviating players. We describe the information
structure during the communication among the deviating players in a model
based on Aumann (1976, 1987).
Deﬁnition 5 Given a coalition S ⊆ N , an information structure of S is a
5-tuple: (Ω,B, µ, (F i)i∈S , (ai)i∈N) where:
(1) The 3-tuple (Ω, B, µ) is a probability space.
(2) The (F i)i∈S are partitions of Ω whose join (
∧
i∈S
F i, the coarsest common
reﬁnement of (F i)i∈S) consists of non-null events.
(3) The (ai)i∈N are random variables in (Ω, B, µ), where a
i : Ω→ Ai.
We interpret (Ω,B) as the space of states of the world for the players of S (at
some stage of their consideration whether to use a deviating device), µ as the
common prior (for the states of the world) for all the players in S, and F i as
the information partition of player i ; that is, if the true state of the world is
ω ∈ Ω then player i is informed of that element F i(ω) of F i that contains
ω. We interpret the random variable ai(ω) as the recommendation of player i
(from the original agreement) in the state ω.
Remark 6 The state of the world ω ∈ Ω includes a full description of the
recommendations all the players received in the original agreement, the infor-
mation that were shared among the members of S, when they communicated
and considered the use of the deviating device, and the beliefs each of the
deviating players has about the information and beliefs of the other players.
We assume that all the players share a common prior about the states of the
world. The justiﬁcation of this assumption is discussed in Aumann (1987).
Given a non-null event E ∈ B, let aS(E) ∈ ∆(AS) be a random variable with
the posterior distribution of aS(ω) conditioned on that ω ∈ E.
The players may only have information structures that are consistent with the
setup described above:
(1) The prior distribution of aS(Ω) is equal to the agreement's distribution.
(2) Each player knows his recommendation.
(3) The deviating players have no information about the recommendations
of the non-deviating players, except the information that is induced by
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their information about their recommendations.
We formalize those requirements in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 7 Given an agreement q ∈ ∆(A) and a coalition S ⊆ N , we say
that an information structure (Ω,B, µ, (F i)i∈S , (ai)i∈S) is a consistent infor-
mation structure (of S) if the following conditions hold:
(1)
∀bS ∈ AS, Pr(aS(Ω) = bS) = q(bS)
(2)
∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ S, ∃bi ∈ Ai s.t. Pr
(
ai
(
F i(ω)
)
= bi
)
= 1
(3)
∀ω ∈Ω, ∀i ∈ S, ∀b ∈ A,
Pr
(
aN
(
F i(ω)
)
= b
)
= Pr
(
aS
(
F i(ω)
)
= bS
)
· q(b−S | bS)
When each player considers whether the implementation of a deviating de-
vice is proﬁtable to him, he compares his conditional expected payoﬀ (given
his information about the distribution of (ai)i∈S ) when playing the original
agreement and when implementing the deviating device. A player agrees to im-
plement a deviating device only if the latter conditional expectation is larger.
We now formally deﬁne the conditional expected payoﬀs of each player in each
state of the world ω, when following the agreement and when implementing a
deviating scheme.
Deﬁnition 8 Given an agreement q ∈ ∆(A), a coalition S ⊆ N , a player i ∈
S, a deviating device dS : AS → ∆(AS), and a consistent information structure
(Ω,B, µ, (F i)i∈S , (ai)i∈S), let the conditional expected payoﬀs of player i in
ω ∈ Ω (given his information in ω and the assumption that the players in −S
follow the agreement q) be:
• The conditional expected payoﬀ when the players in S follow q :
uif (ω) =
∑
bS∈AS
Pr
(
aS
(
F i(ω)
)
= bS
) ∑
b−S∈A−S
q(b−S | bS) · ui(bS, b−S)
• The conditional expected payoﬀ when the players of S deviate (by imple-
menting dS) :
uid(ω) =
∑
bS∈AS
Pr
(
aS
(
F i(ω)
)
= bS
) ∑
b−S∈A−S
q(b−S | bS) ∑
cS∈AS
dS(cS | bS)·ui(cS, b−S)
Observe that uif , u
i
d are measurable in the partition F i, i.e., ω, ω′ ∈ Ω ⇒
uif (ω) = u
i
f (ω
′), uid(ω) = u
i
d(ω
′). In our framework, if the players in S decide
to implement a deviating device in some state ω ∈ Ω, then it is common
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knowledge (in ω) that each player expects to earn more from the deviation
(conditioned on his information). We now present the formal deﬁnition of
common knowledge (Aumann, 1976):
Deﬁnition 9 Given a coalition S ⊆ N , an information structure (Ω,B, µ,
(F i)i∈S , (ai)i∈N) and a state ω ∈ Ω, an event E ∈ B is common knowledge at
ω if E includes that member of the meet Fmeet = ∧
i∈S
F i that contains ω.
We can now deﬁne a proﬁtable ex-post deviating device, as a deviating device
that in some consistent information structure, it is common knowledge in some
state of the world, that each player expects to earn more if the deviating device
is implemented.
Deﬁnition 10 Given a strategy proﬁle q ∈ ∆(A) and a coalition S ⊆ N ,
we say that a deviating device dS : AS → ∆(AS) is a proﬁtable ex-post
deviating device (for S ), if there exists a consistent information structure
(Ω,B, µ, (F i)i∈S , (ai)i∈N) and a state ω0 ∈ Ω such that it is common knowl-
edge in ω0 that ∀i ∈ S, uid(ω) > uif (ω).
We can now deﬁne an ex-post strong correlated equilibrium as a strategy
proﬁle, from which no coalition has a proﬁtable ex-post deviating device.
Deﬁnition 11 A strategy proﬁle q ∈ ∆(A) is an ex-post strong correlated
equilibrium if no coalition S ⊆ N has a proﬁtable ex-post deviating device.
We now deﬁne the conditional expected payoﬀs of each player given the infor-
mation that ω ∈ E.
Deﬁnition 12 Given an agreement q ∈ ∆(A), a coalition S ⊆ N , a deviating
device dS : AS → ∆(AS), a consistent information structure (Ω,B, µ, (F i)i∈S ,
(ai)i∈S), and a non-null event E ∈ B, let
((
u˜if (E)
)
i∈S , (u˜
i
d(E))i∈S
)
denote the
conditional expected payoﬀs given the information that the state of the world
is in E (and given that the players in −S follow the agreement q):
• The conditional expected payoﬀ of each player i when the players in S follow
the agreement q (given ω ∈ E):
u˜if (E) =
∑
bS∈AS
Pr
(
aS (E) = bS
) ∑
b−S∈A−S
q(b−S | bS) · ui(bS, b−S)
• The conditional expected payoﬀ when the players of S deviate by imple-
menting dS (given ω ∈ E):
u˜id(E) =
∑
bS∈AS
Pr
(
aS (E) = bS
) ∑
b−S∈A−S
q(b−S | bS) ∑
cS∈AS
dS(cS | bS)·ui(cS, b−S)
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Observe the diﬀerence between deﬁnition 8 and deﬁnition 12:
• In deﬁnition 8 uif (ω) and uid(ω) describe the conditional utility of player
i (in the state of the world ω ∈ Ω) in the perspective of player i, who is
informed in ω, that the state of the world in in F i(ω).
• In deﬁnition 12 u˜if (E) and u˜id(E) describe the conditional utility of player i
in the perspective of an outside observer, who is informed that the state of
the world is in E.
Diﬀerent notions of ex-post strong correlated equilibria are presented in Einy &
Peleg (1995), Ray (1998) and Bloch & Dutta (2007). In the framework of Einy
& Peleg, a deviating coalition can only use deviating devices that improve the
conditional utilities of all deviating players for all possible recommendation
proﬁles. 6 In the framework of Ray, a deviating coalition S can only use pure
deviating devices - dS : AS → AS. In the framework of Bloch & Dutta, a
deviating coalition S can only use deviating devices that are implemented if
and only if the recommendation proﬁle aS is included in some set ES ⊆ AS
which satisﬁes:
(1) If aS ∈ ES, each player earns from implementing the deviating device.
(2) If aS /∈ ES, then at least one player looses from implementing the devia-
tion device (by falsely claiming that aS ∈ ES).
It can be shown that those conditions imply that there exists a consistent
information structure of S and a state in which it is common knowledge that
aS(ω) ∈ ES and that ∀i ∈ S, uid(ω) > uif (ω). Thus our set of ex-post strong
correlated equilibria is included in the sets of ex-post correlated equilibria as
deﬁned in any of those papers (we require resistance against a wider range of
ex-post proﬁtable deviating devices).
4 Main Result
In this Section we prove our main result:
Theorem 13 Every ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is also an ex-post
strong correlated equilibrium.
In other words: if a proﬁtable ex-post deviating device from an agreement
q ∈ 4(A) exists, then there also exists a proﬁtable ex-ante deviation from q.
The theorem immediately follows from the following two propositions:
6 In our formulation, it is equivalent to requiring that ∀i ∈ S, uid(ω) > uif (ω) in
every ω ∈ Ω, and not only in every ω ∈ Fmeet(ω0) .
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(1) Proposition 14: If an agreement q is not an ex-post strong correlated
equilibrium, then there exists a similar agreement q˜ that is not an ex-
ante strong correlated equilibrium. The similarity is in the sense that q˜
is absolute continues w.r.t. q when restricted to AS, and equal to q when
restricted to A−S and conditioned on AS (as formally deﬁned below).
(2) Proposition 15: If such a similar agreement q˜ is not an ex-ante strong
correlated equilibrium, then q itself is not an ex-ante strong correlated
equilibrium.
Proposition 14 Let q ∈ ∆(A) be a strategy proﬁle (the agreement) that
is not an ex-post strong correlated equilibrium. Then there exists a strategy
proﬁle q˜ ∈ ∆(A) that satisﬁes the following conditions:
(1) q˜|S is absolute continues with respect to q|S :
∀bS ∈ AS, q(bS) = 0⇒ q˜(bS) = 0
(2) Conditioned on S -part of the recommendations: q˜|−S = q|−S:
∀bS ∈ AS, ∀b−S ∈ A−S, q˜(b−S | bS) = q(b−S | bS)
(3) q˜ is not an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium.
PROOF. Let S ⊆ N be a coalition, let dS : AS → ∆(AS) be a deviating
device, let (Ω,B, µ, (F i)i∈S , (ai)i∈N) be a consistent information structure, and
let ω0 ∈ Ω be a state, such that it is common knowledge in ω0 that ∀i, uid(ω) >
uif (ω), i.e., F
meet(ω0) ⊆
{
ω | uid(ω) > uif (ω)
}
. Let i ∈ S be a deviating player.
Write Fmeet = Fmeet(ω0) =
⋃
j
F ij where the F
i
j are disjoint members of F i.
Since uid(ω) > u
i
f (ω) throughout F
meet, then ∀j, u˜id(F ij ) > u˜if (F ij ). Observe
that if E1, E2 ∈ B are two disjoint non-null events then: u˜if (E1
⋃
E2) = (µ(E1)·
u˜if (E1)+µ(E2)·u˜if (E2))/µ(E1+E2) and u˜id(E1
⋃
E2) = (µ(E1)·u˜id(E1)+µ(E2)·
u˜id(E2))/µ(E1 +E2). Thus, it follows that u˜
i
d(F
meet) > u˜if (F
meet). This is true
for every player, thus ∀i∈S u˜id(Fmeet) > u˜if (Fmeet).
Let q˜ be the following strategy proﬁle: ∀bS ∈ AS, ∀b−S ∈ A−S, q˜(b) = q˜(bS, b−S) =
Pr
(
aS(Fmeet) = bS
)
· q(b−S | bS). We show that the three conditions are sat-
isﬁed:
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(1)
∀bS ∈AS, q(bS) = 0⇒ Pr
(
aS(Ω) = bS
)
= 0
⇒ Pr
(
aS(Fmeet) = bS
)
= 0⇒ q˜(bS) = 0
(2)
∀bS ∈AS, ∀b−S ∈ A−S, q˜(b−S | bS) = q˜(b
−S, bS)
q˜(bS)
=
Pr
(
aS(Fmeet) = bS
)
· q(b−S | bS)
Pr (aS(Fmeet) = bS)
= q(b−S | bS)
(3) We have to show that q˜ is not an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium.
Observe that:
u˜if (F
meet) =
∑
bS∈AS
Pr
(
aS
(
Fmeet
)
= bS
) ∑
b−S∈A−S
q(b−S | bS) · ui(bS, b−S)
=
∑
b∈A
q˜(b) · ui(b) = ui(q˜)
let p˜ be the ex-ante feasible deviation that is induced from q˜ by the
deviating device dS.
u˜id(F
meet) =
∑
bS∈AS
Pr
(
aS
(
Fmeet
)
= bS
) ∑
b−S∈A−S
q(b−S | bS)
∑
cS∈AS
dS(cS | bS) · ui(cS, b−S)
=
∑
b∈A
q˜(b)
∑
cS∈AS
dS(cS | bS) · ui(cS, b−S) = ui(p˜)
This implies that: ∀i ∈ S, u˜id(Fmeet) > u˜if (Fmeet)⇒ ui(p˜) > ui(q˜), thus q˜
is not an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium. QED.
We ﬁnish our main result by the following proposition: If a similar agreement
q˜ is not an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium, then q itself is not an ex-ante
strong correlated equilibrium.
Proposition 15 Let q, q˜ ∈ ∆(A) be two strategy proﬁles that satisfy the
following conditions:
(1) q˜|S is absolute continues with respect to q|S :
∀bS ∈ AS, q(bS) = 0⇒ q˜(bS) = 0
.
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(2) Conditioned on S -part of the recommendations: q˜|−S = q|−S:
∀bS ∈ AS, ∀b−S ∈ A−S, q˜(b−S | bS) = q(b−S | bS)
(3) q˜ is not an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium.
Then q is not an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium.
PROOF. For simplicity of notation, we assume w.l.o.g. that ∀aS ∈ AS q(aS) >
0 (because q(aS) = 0 ⇒ q˜(aS) = 0, and those impossible action proﬁles
do not aﬀect any of the utilities functions and can be omitted). Let d˜S :
AS → ∆(AS) be a deviating device, such that ∀i, ui(p˜) > ui(q˜), where
p˜ ∈ ∆(A) is the feasible deviation induced from d˜S. Let m = max |
i∈S
Ai| and
let ε = 1
m
min
aS∈AS , q˜(aS)>0
q(aS)
q˜(aS)
. We begin by constructing an auxiliary deviating
device d˜Sε : A
S → ∆(AS):
d˜Sε (a
S|bS) =

εd˜S(aS|bS) aS 6= bS
1− ∑
cS 6=bS
εd˜S(cS|bS) aS = bS
In the deviating device d˜Sε the players of S follow the agreement with proba-
bility 1− ε, and deviate according to d˜S with probability ε. Let p˜ε ∈ D(q˜, S)
be the feasible ex-ante deviation of S from q˜ that is induced by d˜Sε . Observe
that p˜ε is a proﬁtable deviation for all the players in S : ∀i∈S, ui(q˜) < ui(p˜ε)
(because ui(q˜)− ui(p˜ε) = ε (ui(q˜)− ui(p˜)) < 0).
We continue by constructing the following deviating device (of S ) dS : AS →
∆(AS):
dS(aS|bS) =

q˜(bS)
q(bS)
· d˜Sε (aS|bS) aS 6= bS
1− ∑
cS 6=bS
q˜(bS)
q(bS)
· d˜Sε (cS|bS) aS = bS
.
We ﬁrst show that dS is a valid deviating device by validating that ∀aS, bS ∈
AS 0 ≤ dS(aS|bS) ≤ 1.
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∀aS 6= bS, dS(aS|bS) = q˜(b
S)
q(bS)
· d˜Sε (aS|bS) =
q˜(bS)
q(bS)
· εd˜S(aS|bS)
=
q˜(bS)
q(bS)
· 1
m
(
min
aS∈AS , q˜(aS)>0
q(aS)
q˜(aS)
)
· d˜S(aS|bS)
≤ q˜(b
S)
q(bS)
· 1
m
· q(b
S)
q˜(bS)
· d˜S(aS|bS) = 1
m
· d˜S(aS|bS) ≤ 1
And using the inequality (which is a part of the last chain of inequalities):
q˜(bS)
q(bS)
· d˜Sε (aS|bS) ≤
1
m
· d˜S(aS|bS)
We get:
dS(aS|aS) = 1− ∑
aS 6=bS
q˜(bS)
q(bS)
· d˜Sε (aS|bS) ≥ 1−
1
m
∑
aS 6=bS
d˜S(aS|bS) ≥ 1− 1 ≥ 0.
Let p ∈ D(q, S) be the feasible ex-ante deviation that is induced by dS. We
ﬁnish the proof by showing that p is a proﬁtable deviation from q : i.e.,
∀i ∈ S, ui(q) < ui(p)), and thus q is not an ex-ante strong correlated equi-
librium. Let i ∈ S. We show: ui(p) − ui(q) ?= ui(p˜ε) − ui(q˜) > 0. Observe
that:
ui(q) =
∑
a∈A
q(a) · ui(a) = ∑
aS∈AS
q(aS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|aS) · ui(a)
ui(p) =
∑
a∈A
p(a) · ui(a) = ∑
aS∈AS
∑
bS∈AS
q(bS) · dS(aS|bS) ∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|bS) · ui(a)
Therefore:
ui(p)− ui(q) = ∑
aS∈AS
∑
bS∈AS
q(bS) · dS(aS|bS) ∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|bS) · ui(a)
− ∑
aS∈AS
q(aS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|aS) · ui(a)
=
∑
aS∈AS
∑
bS 6=aS
q(bS) · dS(aS|bS) ∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|bS) · ui(a)
− ∑
aS∈AS
q(aS) ·
(
1− dS(aS|aS)
) ∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−s|aS) · ui(a)
=
∑
aS∈AS
∑
bS 6=aS
q˜(bS) · d˜Sε (aS|bS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|bS) · ui(a)
− ∑
aS∈AS
q˜(aS) ·
(
1− d˜Sε (aS|aS)
) ∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−s|aS) · ui(a)
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Last equality is due to the following two equalities:
∀aS 6= bS, q(bS) · dS(aS|bS) = q(bS) q˜(b
S)
q(bS)
· d˜Sε (aS|bS) = q˜(bS) · d˜Sε (aS|bS)
q(aS) ·
(
1− dS(aS|aS)
)
= q(aS)
∑
cS 6=aS
q˜(aS)
q(aS)
· d˜Sε (cS|aS)
= q˜(aS)
∑
cS 6=aS
q(aS)
q˜(aS)
· q˜(a
S)
q(aS)
· d˜Sε (cS|aS)
= q˜(aS)
∑
cS 6=aS
d˜Sε (c
S|aS)
= q˜(aS) ·
(
1− d˜Sε (aS|aS)
)
We ﬁnish the proof by showing that the last expression is equal to ui(p˜ε)−ui(q˜).
Observe that:
ui(p˜ε) =
∑
a∈A
p˜ε(a) · ui(a)
=
∑
aS∈AS
∑
bS∈AS
q˜(bS) · d˜Sε (aS|bS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|bS) · ui(a)
ui(q˜) =
∑
a∈A
q˜(a) · ui(a) = ∑
aS∈AS
q˜(aS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|aS) · ui(a)
Therefore:
ui(pε)− ui(q˜) =
∑
aS∈AS
∑
bS∈AS
q˜(bS) · d˜Sε (aS|bS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|bS) · ui(a)
− ∑
aS∈AS
q˜(aS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|aS)ui(a)
=
∑
aS∈AS
∑
bS 6=aS
q˜(bS) · d˜Sε (aS|bS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|bS) · ui(a)
− ∑
aS∈AS
q˜(aS)
(
1− d˜Sε (aS|aS)
) ∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−s|aS)ui(a)
QED.
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5 An Ex-ante Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibria
In the last Section we show that strong correlated equilibrium a` la Moreno &
Wooders is also appropriate to frameworks in which players can communicate
both at ex-ante and at ex-post stages. A natural question is whether a similar
result holds for their notion of coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. In this
Section we show that the answer is negative, by presenting an example in
which there is an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium that is not a
self enforcing agreement in a framework in which communication is possible
at both stages.
5.1 A Deﬁnition of an Ex-ante Coalition-Proof Equilibrium
In this Sub-section we formally deﬁne an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated
equilibrium. We begin by deﬁning a self-enforcing ex-ante deviation as a fea-
sible ex-ante deviation, such that no proper sub-coalition has a further self-
enforcing and improving deviation:
Deﬁnition 16 Let q ∈ ∆(A) be a strategy proﬁle and let S ⊆ N be a coali-
tion. The set of self enforcing deviations by the coalition S from q, SED(q, S)
is deﬁned, recursively, as follows:
(1) If |S| = 1, then SED(q, S) = D(q, S).
(2) If |S| > 1, then SED(q, S) ={
p ∈ D(q, S) | ∀R ⊂ S, ∀r ∈ SED(p,R), ∃i ∈ R, : ui(r) ≤ ui(p)
}
We now deﬁne an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium as a strategy
proﬁle from which no coalition has a self-enforcing and improving deviation:
Deﬁnition 17 (deﬁnition 1.4 of Moreno & Wooders) A strategy proﬁle q ∈
∆(A) is a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium if no coalition S ⊆ N has a
self-enforcing deviation p ∈ SED(q, S), such that for each i ⊆ S, we have
ui(p) > ui(q).
5.2 An Example of an Ex-ante Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilbirum
In the following example we present a two-player game and an ex-ante coalition-
proof correlated equilibrium, and explain why it is not a self-enforcing agree-
ment in a framework in which the players can communicate at both stage (ex-
ante and ex-post). The example is adapted from Bloch & Dutta (2007). Table 4
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presents the Matrix representation of the game and an ex-ante coalition-proof
correlated equilibrium in this game.
Table 4
A Two-Player Game and an Ex-ante Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium
b1 b2 b3
a1 6,6 -2,0 0,7
a2 2,2 2,2 0,0
a3 0,0 0,0 3,3
b1 b2 b3
a1 1/2 0 0
a2 1/4 1/4 0
a3 0 0 0
We ﬁrst show that the proﬁle presented in table 4 is an ex-ante coalition-
proof equilibrium. First, observe that the proﬁle is a correlated equilibrium:
no player has a proﬁtable unilateral deviation. Moreno & Wooders (1996) have
proved that in a two-player game, every correlated proﬁle which is not Pareto-
dominated by another correlated equilibrium is a coalition-proof correlated
equilibrium. Our proﬁle gives each player a payoﬀ of 4. Thus we prove that
the proﬁle is an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium, by showing
that any correlated equilibrium q gives player 1 a payoﬀ of at most 4. Let
x = q (a1, b1). Observe that q (a2, b1) ≥ x/2 because otherwise player 1 would
have a proﬁtable deviation: playing b3 when recommended b1. This implies
q (a2, b2) ≥ x/2, because otherwise player 2 would have a proﬁtable deviation
(playing a1 when recommended a2). Thus the payoﬀ of q conditioned on that
the recommendation proﬁle is in A = ((a1, b1) , (a2, b1) , (a2, b2)) is at most 4,
and because the payoﬀ of q conditioned on that the recommendation proﬁle
is not in A is at most 3, then the total payoﬀ of q is at most 4.
We now explain why this proﬁle is not a self-enforcing agreement in a frame-
work in which the players can communicate and plan deviations also at the
ex-post stage. 7 Assume that the players have agreed to play the proﬁle, and
player 1 has received a recommendation a2. In that case, he can communicate
with player 1 at the ex-post stage, tell him that he received a2 (and thus if
the players follow the recommendation proﬁle they would get a payoﬀ of 2),
and suggest a joint deviation - playing (a3, b3). As player 1 has no incentive
to lie (to make a false claim that his recommendation is a2 when it is a1),
then player 2 would believe player 1, and they would both play (a3, b3). This
ex-post deviation is self-enforcing: (a3, b3) is a Nash equilibrium, and thus no
player has a proﬁtable sub-deviation.
7 The proﬁle is not an ex-post coalition-proof correlated equilibrium according to the
deﬁnitions of Bloch & Dutta (2007) and Ray (1998), and according to our informal
notion (which have not formally deﬁned) of an ex-post coalition-proof correlated
equilibrium in the framework of consistent information structures. The proﬁle is an
ex-post coalition-proof correlated equilibrium according to the deﬁnition of Einy &
Peleg, due to their requirement that an ex-post deviation would be strictly proﬁtable
to each player given all recommendations he may receive.
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Observe that the same deviation is not selfenforcing in the ex-ante stage. If
the players agree at the ex-ante stage to implement a deviating device that
changes (a2, b1) into (a3, b3), then player 2 will have a proﬁtable sub-deviation
- playing b3 when recommended b1. Similarly, if they agree to implement a
deviating device that changes (a2, b2) into (a3, b3), then player 1 will have a
proﬁtable sub-deviation - playing a1 when recommended a2.
6 Concluding Remarks
(1) Bayesian games: Moreno & Wooders (1996) present a notion of ex-ante
strong communication equilibrium in Bayesian games. Our result can be
extended to this framework as well, to show that an ex-ante 8 strong
communication equilibrium is also resistant to deviations at the ex-post
stage.
(2) Intermediate stage: In some frameworks, the process in which players re-
ceive their recommendations from the correlating device may be long.
Thus, coalitions may also plan deviations during this process, when some
of them know their recommendations, and other do not. 9 One can al-
ter our deﬁnition of consistent information structure (deﬁnition 7), by
omitting the second requirement (that each player knows his recommen-
dation). This requirement is not used in the proof of our main theorem,
and thus an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is also resistant to de-
viations in such an intermediate stage.
(3) k-strong equilibria: In Heller (2008) an ex-ante notion of k -strong corre-
lated equilibrium is deﬁned as a strategy proﬁle that is resistant to all
coalitional deviations of up to k players. Our result can be directly ex-
tended to this notion as well: an ex-ante k -strong correlated equilibrium
is resistant to deviations of up to k players at all stages.
(4) Related Literature:
(a) The question of existence of strong and coalition-proof correlated
equilibria is discussed in Moreno & Wooders (1996), Milgrom &
Roberts (1996), Ray (1996), Holzman & Law-Yone (1996), Bloch &
Dutta (2007).
(b) Applications of strong and coalition-proof equilibria are presented
and discussed in Bernheim & Whinston (1986, 1987), Einy & Peleg
(1996) and Delgado & Moreno (2004).
8 The stage is ex-ante with respect to the recommendations of the correlated agree-
ment. However, all possible deviations are planned only after each player knows his
type (i.e., it is interim stage with respect to the types of the players).
9 An example for such a framework is the implementation of a strong correlated
equilibrium by a polite protocol in cheap-talk (Heller, 2008). A polite protocol is a
strategy proﬁle in the cheap talk extended game, in which in every talk phase at
most one player sends a message (players do not send messages simultaneously).
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